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ANTICIPATING SURPRISE
Analysis for Strategic Warning
CYNTHIA M. GRABO
With a Foreword by
Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA (Ret.)
Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
ANTICIPATING SURPRISE
Analysis for Strategic Warning
Cynthia M. Grabo
Joint Military
Intelligence College
Joint Military
Intelligence College
Edited by Jan Goldman
With a Foreword by
Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA (Ret.)
Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
i
The Joint Military Intelligence College supports and
encourages research on intelligence issues that
distills lessons and improves support to policy-level
and operational consumers.
Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning
December 2002
This book is a publication of the Joint Military Intelligence College’s Center for Strategic
Intelligence Research. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States
Government. U.S. Government officials can obtain additional copies of the book directly
or through liaison channels from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Others may obtain the
book through the U.S. Government Printing Office (www.gpo.gov) or the National
Technical Information Service (www.ntis.gov).
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) has approved this document for
unrestricted public release.
Russell G. Swenson, Director, Center for Strategic Intelligence Research
(
Russell.Swenson@dia.mil
)
Library of Congress Control Number
2002115175
ISBN
0-9656195-6-7
ii
FOREWORD
At his confirmation hearing the present Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet,
defined his job by saying he was hired “not to observe and comment but to warn and
protect.’’ Unfortunately, few members of the Intelligence Community remain from among
the corps of experts developed during the Cold War to provide warning. Warning is a skill
unto itself, requiring an understanding of the attitudes and disciplines of potential
adversaries as well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and their biases.
In an era of asymmetric warfare in which our national security and well being can be
seriously threatened by hostile groups as well as nations, it is imperative that lessons from
the past not be forgotten but be brought up to date and the discipline of warning
reinvigorated. Warning intelligence differs significantly from current intelligence and the
preparation of long-range estimates. It accepts the presumption of surprise and
incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive research upon which to build the case for
specific warning. Relationships among events or involving the players may not be readily
evident at first and initial signs often consist of fragmentary evidence, conflicting reports,
or an absence of something. It is not merely a compilation of facts. It is an abstraction, an
intangible, a perception or a belief.
While a specific methodology for developing warning may have been tailored to the
needs of the Cold War, the same principles apply even to asymmetric conflict. This
updated and revised edition of an earlier, classified publication is an excellent primer for
both intelligence analysts and policymakers. Events have shown that accurate and timely
warning has most often been produced by a minority viewpoint brought to the attention of
decisionmakers in some way; it is not the product of a majority consensus.
In the rush to build new intelligence mechanisms to combat terrorist attacks and to
provide warning for the homeland as well as for forces deployed, the nation and the
Intelligence Community would be well served by reviewing this book to gain an
understanding of what constitutes warning and how it is arrived at. As the author points
out, “warning does not exist until it has been conveyed to the policymaker, and ...he must
know that he has been warned.’’
All intelligence professionals and key policymakers must understand the principles
outlined in this very relevant publication.
LTG James Williams (Ret.)
Former Director,
Defense Intelligence Agency
iii
EDITOR’S PREFACE
This book written 30 years ago and its message could not be more relevant today. After
World War II, the U.S. Intelligence Community’s main objective was to understand the
intentions and capabilities of the Communist threat. This meant a focus on the Soviet
Union and its allies. Data on the number and capabilities of tanks, airplanes or ships in the
inventory of the Warsaw Pact were not easy to come by, although somewhat easier to
obtain than insight into the intentions of Communist leaders. A well-placed spy or
satellite with a camera could yield some information but far from the whole picture. One
of the most knowledgeable analysts who understood the importance of addressing both
capabilities and intentions as a central part of the intelligence process was a woman—
Cynthia Grabo. Intelligence analysis was dominated by men before, during, and after
World War II. In this environment, Ms. Grabo stood out.
Cynthia Grabo worked as an intelligence analyst for the U.S. government from 1942 to
1980. After graduating from the University of Chicago with undergraduate and graduate
degrees, she was recruited by Army Intelligence shortly after Pearl Harbor. Although she
served in various capacities during the war, from 1949 for the remainder of her career she
specialized in strategic warning. Assigned to the interagency staff called the National
Indications Center, she served as a senior researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch
Committee throughout its existence (1950 to 1975), and for its successor organization the
Strategic Warning Staff. It was during this time that Ms. Grabo recognized the need to
capture the institutional memory associated with strategic warning.
At the time, she already had three decades of experience in the Intelligence
Community, having witnessed perceived U.S. intelligence and warning failures in Korea,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. In the summer of 1972, the Defense Intelligence
Agency published her
as a classified document,
followed by two additional classified volumes, one in the fall of 1972 and the last in 1974.
These recently declassified books have been condensed from the original three volumes
into this one. The Joint Military Intelligence College proudly offers to the Intelligence
Community and to the public Ms. Grabo’s authoritative interpretation of an appropriate
analytic strategy for intelligence-based warning.
Handbook of Warning Intelligence
Ms. Grabo’s awards include: the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Exceptional Civilian
Service Medal, The Central Intelligence Agency’s Sherman Kent award for outstanding
contribution to the literature of intelligence, and the National Intelligence Medal of
Achievement. Since her retirement, she has served on the Board of Directors of the
Association of Former Intelligence Officers and has authored several articles for the
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
, the
International Military
and Defense Encyclopedia
and the Central Intelligence Agency’s
Studies in Intelligence
.
The viability of the U.S. intelligence system depends on analysts, collectors,
humanists and technologists, all of whom must be willing in their assessments and
creative work to share risks with appropriate intelligence consumers. Commanders and
v
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