GAO - Nuclear Smuggling Defense Not Good.pdf - DECLASSIFIED BOOKS - rc51

United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on

Cybersecurity, Infrastructure

Protection, and Security Technologies,

Committee on Homeland Security,

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. ET

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

COMBATING

NUCLEAR

SMUGGLING

Past Work and

Preliminary

Observations on

Research and

Development at the

Domestic Nuclear

Detection Office

Statement of David C. Trimble, Director

Natural Resources and Environment

GAO-14-783T

July 2014

COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

Past Work and Preliminary Observations on Research

and Development at the Domestic Nuclear Detection

Office

Highlights of GAO-14-783T , a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,

Infrastructure Protection, and Security

Technologies, Committee on Homeland

Security, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study

Preventing terrorists from using

nuclear or radiological material to carry

out an attack in the United States is a

top national priority. Within DHS,

DNDO’s mission is to (1) improve

capabilities to deter, detect, respond

to, and attribute attacks, in

coordination with domestic and

international partners, and (2) conduct

R&D on radiation and nuclear

detection devices. GAO has reported

on progress and challenges in DNDO’s

efforts since 2006 and is currently

reviewing DNDO’s planning and

prioritization of its R&D investments.

This testimony discusses GAO’s past

work on DNDO’s efforts to develop the

GNDA and deploy radiation detection

equipment and DHS’s efforts to

coordinate R&D across the agency, as

well as preliminary observations from

GAO’s ongoing review of DNDO’s

research directorate’s efforts to (1)

manage its R&D investments to align

with critical mission needs and (2)

coordinate its R&D efforts internally,

with other federal research agencies,

and with end users of the technology it

develops.

To conduct its ongoing review, GAO

analyzed DHS documents and data

related to how DNDO plans and

prioritizes its R&D program, and

interviewed officials on coordinating

R&D.

GAO is not making any new

recommendations in this statement. As

GAO continues to complete its ongoing

work, it will consider the need for any

new recommendations as appropriate.

DHS provided technical comments,

which were incorporated as

appropriate.

What GAO Found

GAO has reported on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic

Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) since 2006. GAO has identified challenges

and made recommendations in the following areas:

•

DNDO’s efforts to develop the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

(GNDA): In 2008, GAO recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan to

guide the development of the GNDA, a framework for 74 independent

programs, projects, or activities to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling. In

2010, DHS issued a plan and GAO reviewed this plan and found that it

generally addressed GAO’s recommendations.

•

DNDO’s efforts to replace radiation detection equipment: GAO has

found challenges in DNDO’s efforts to develop and deploy radiation portal

monitors, which scan for nuclear or radiological materials at ports of entry.

GAO has made several recommendations throughout the history of these

efforts, and DNDO has taken actions that have generally been responsive.

•

DHS’s efforts to coordinate research and development (R&D) across

the agency. In 2012 and 2013, GAO made recommendations to help DHS

oversee its R&D investments and efforts, and in particular its border and

maritime R&D efforts. GAO’s recommendations focused on strengthening

coordination and defining R&D across the agency. DHS concurred with

GAO’s recommendations and described actions it plans to take in response.

Preliminary observations from GAO’s ongoing review are that DNDO has taken

steps to manage R&D and assess project outcomes, but that it may not be able

to demonstrate how agency investments align with critical mission needs. DNDO

officials told GAO that they discuss how research projects may contribute to

critical mission needs but that they do not document these discussions. Once

research projects are complete, DNDO officials told GAO they evaluate the

success of individual research projects, but DNDO does not have a systematic

approach to ensure its overall R&D investments address gaps in the GNDA. As a

result, DNDO may not be able to demonstrate to key stakeholders—including

oversight organizations and potential users of new technologies—that its R&D

investments are aligned with critical mission needs.

GAO’s ongoing work indicates that DNDO officials have taken some steps to

coordinate R&D efforts internally, with other federal agencies, and with end

users, but preliminary analysis shows that not all of DNDO’s end users are

satisfied with DNDO’s communication. DNDO directorates work closely to identify

critical mission needs, and DNDO collaborates with other federal research

agencies to leverage expertise. However, DNDO’s end users varied in their

satisfaction with DNDO’s efforts to coordinate with them. Officials from two end

user agencies told GAO that coordination was working well; however, officials

from the largest end user agency stated that they were generally dissatisfied with

DNDO’s coordination because DNDO’s research directorate does not provide

them information directly and, in some cases, found that project requirements

would not meet the agency’s operational needs. This is consistent with GAO’s

2010 finding that inadequate communication caused DNDO to pursue scanning

technology that would not meet the operational requirements of the end user if it

were deployed.

View GAO-14-783T . For more information,

contact David C. Trimble at (202) 512-3841 or

trimbled@gao.gov .

United States Government Accountability Office

Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work on the

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection

Office (DNDO) and our preliminary observations on DNDO’s

management and coordination of its research and development (R&D)

investments as you consider the reauthorization of DNDO. Preventing

terrorists from using nuclear or radiological material to carry out an attack

in the United States is a top national priority. Terrorists could use these

materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological

dispersal device (also called a “dirty bomb”). The detonation of a nuclear

device in an urban setting could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths

and devastate buildings and physical infrastructure for miles. While not as

damaging, a radiological dispersal device could nonetheless cause

hundreds of millions of dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a

city would have to be evacuated—and possibly remain inaccessible—until

an extensive radiological decontamination effort was completed. A key

element of the strategy for protecting the homeland from the

consequences of nuclear or radiological terrorism is the Global Nuclear

Detection Architecture (GNDA), a multilayered framework encompassing

74 independent programs, projects, or activities by the federal

government and its partners to detect and interdict nuclear smuggling in

foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. 1

Within DHS, DNDO is responsible for improving the nation’s capabilities

to deter, detect, respond to, and attribute attacks, in coordination with

domestic and international partners.

To accomplish this, DNDO is

organized into directorates that support elements of its mission. Three of

these directorates are relevant to my testimony today: (1) the Architecture

and Plans Directorate, which analyzes gaps in the GNDA and develops

strategies and plans for the GNDA in coordination with its partners; (2)

the Product Acquisition and Deployment (Acquisition) Directorate, which

is responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection

1 U.S. government partners include state, tribal, and local governments, the private sector,

and international partners.

2 DNDO was established in 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-

43/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-14 and codified in statute by the

Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-

347 § 501, 120 Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 591).

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GAO-14-783T

equipment to support the efforts of federal, state, and local agencies that

use radiation detection equipment to carry out their mission; and (3) the

Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Directorate, which

conducts R&D of radiation and nuclear detection devices and furthers the

development of technologies to support the domestic component of the

GNDA. DNDO established the TAR Directorate in 2006 to identify,

explore, develop, and demonstrate scientific and technological

approaches that meet one or more of the following criteria: address gaps

in the GNDA; improve the performance of domestic radiological and

nuclear detection systems and enabling technologies; or increase the

operational efficiency of detection technology for domestic end users:

primarily DHS’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but also Coast

Guard, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and state and local

law enforcement. DNDO’s TAR Directorate makes R&D investments

based on competitive awards to researchers in government laboratories,

academia, and private industry for basic and applied R&D efforts. From

fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, the TAR Directorate obligated

approximately $328 million for about 205 projects focused on basic

research, technology prototypes, software development, and computer

modeling for the detection of radioactive and nuclear materials, among

other things. The TAR Directorate’s total budget, including R&D, for fiscal

year 2014 was $71.1 million.

My testimony today is based on reports we issued from March 2006 to

September 2013, as well as preliminary observations from our ongoing

review for this Subcommittee of the TAR Directorate’s efforts to plan,

prioritize, and assess outcomes of its R&D program. Specifically, my

statement today discusses our past work on DNDO’s efforts to develop

the GNDA and deploy radiation detection equipment and DHS’s efforts to

coordinate R&D across the agency, as well as preliminary observations

from our ongoing review of the TAR Directorate’s efforts to (1) manage its

R&D investments to align with critical mission needs and (2) coordinate

its R&D efforts internally, with other federal research agencies, and with

the end users of the technology it develops.

Detailed information on our scope and methodology for our prior work can

be found in the reports cited throughout this statement. To develop our

preliminary observations on the TAR Directorate’s efforts to manage and

coordinate its R&D investments, we reviewed agency documents that

identify critical mission needs for R&D and the TAR Directorate’s process

for planning and prioritizing R&D investments. We also obtained data

from the TAR Directorate’s project database that contained information on

all ongoing and completed research projects funded from fiscal year 2008

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GAO-14-783T

through 2013, which we used to determine the total number of TAR

Directorate research projects and obligations allocated during this period.

To assess the reliability of the data, we interviewed the TAR Directorate

officials responsible for maintaining the database and determined the

data were reliable for providing background information on the TAR

Directorate’s projects. Our review does not include the TAR Directorate’s

nuclear forensics portfolio because projects in that portfolio are not

selected using the same planning and prioritization process as projects in

the TAR Directorate’s other research areas. We interviewed the Assistant

Directors of the TAR Directorate, the Architecture and Plans Directorate,

and the Acquisition Directorate. We also interviewed the TAR

Directorate’s research managers on the TAR Directorate’s process for

identifying critical mission needs, selecting research topics and projects,

managing and evaluating research areas, coordinating R&D, and aligning

R&D investments with critical mission needs. We also interviewed officials

at federal agencies with a R&D component and potential end users of

technology developed under DNDO’s R&D program to understand how

DNDO coordinates the planning of R&D. Specifically, we interviewed

officials at the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction

Agency and the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security

Administration (NNSA) and end users at DHS’ CBP, the Coast Guard,

and TSA to understand their involvement in DNDO’s R&D planning,

prioritization, and evaluation process. We shared the information on our

preliminary findings with officials from DNDO, CBP, Coast Guard, TSA,

the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and NNSA. DNDO and the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency officials provided technical comments,

which we incorporated, as appropriate. We expect to issue a final report

on this work in December 2014.

The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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GAO-14-783T

GAO - Nuclear Smuggling Defense Not Good.pdf

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